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Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector
Connie K. Chant
I. INTRODUCTION
Lisa Laplante and Suzanne Spears undertake an admirable agenda in
their article, Extracting Without Conflict: The Case for Community Consent
Processes.' Employing an anthropological approach to understanding
community resistance to extractive industry projects, the authors posit that
the escalating conflicts between extractive industry (EI) firms and host
communities can be "better understood as disputes over community
control of resources and the right of community members to control the
direction of their lives." 2  Their proposed solution is that El firms
voluntarily engage in consent processes with host communities, with a
commitment to obtaining their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)
before receiving legal authorization and financial approval of an extractive
project. It is obvious that host communities would favor a process that
accords them full participatory rights -including the right to withhold
their consent-in development decisions affecting the land and resources
on which they subsist. Laplante and Spears present the more complicated
case for why EI firms should likewise be amenable to voluntary FPIC
procedures, relying on the fact that community opposition can prove to be
cost-prohibitive.
t B.A. 2005, Yale College; J.D. candidate (2010), Yale Law School.
1. Lisa J. Laplante and Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Casefor Community
Consent Processes, 11 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 69 (2008).
2. Id. at 69.
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While this Response in no way intends to undermine the value of
voluntary corporate commitments to obtain community consent, it
questions the extent to which the enforcement of community FPIC rights
can or should be entrusted to private entities. While it may make business
sense to pursue voluntary FPIC in certain concession agreements, others
scenarios may not not present such a clear business case. Absent robust
legal safeguards enforceable against corporate actors, it is somewhat
misleading to regard community consent as a right creating an obligation
on the part of private extractive industry firms, as such so-called rights are
effectively granted or withdrawn at the behest of the company. To that
end, this Response strives to restore attention on the goal of securing
community participatory rights in enforceable international law and argues
that, while voluntary FPIC processes are certainly desirable, they should
not divert attention away from holding host state governments accountable
for obtaining a community's free, prior, and informed consent before
undertaking development projects that impact its land and resources. By
enforcing these legal obligations against state actors, international law also
strengthens the business case for FPIC compliance among non-state actors.
This Response will first briefly outline the current scope of FPIC rights
as recognized under international law and identify their limitations. Next,
it will suggest why the lack of adequate community rights guarantees
under international law may undermine or even defeat the business and
development case for voluntary FPIC. Finally, this Response will propose
that a more compelling business and development case for voluntary FPIC
can be made if the FPIC model is focused less on granting communities
veto power over development projects and more on achieving multi-
stakeholder consensus through guarantees of robust procedural
participation rights.
II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF COMMUNITIES' RIGHTS TO FREE, PRIOR INFORMED
CONSENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In building their business case for voluntary adoption of FPIC
procedures, Laplante and Spears point to the fact that "communities-
particularly of indigenous peoples-are growing more vocal and are
gaining increasing recognition of their rights." 3  Other authors have
similarly argued that indigenous peoples' right to free, prior informed
consent is gaining "increasing currency" in international law, as recognized
by various international organizations and in binding and non-binding
instruments. 4  The International Labor Organization's Convention
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
imposes treaty obligations upon ratifying states to recognize the rights or
3. Id. at 84.
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ownership and possession of indigenous peoples over the lands which they
traditionally occupy or to which they have traditionally had access for their
subsistence and traditional activities.5 In addition to the ILO Convention, a
fair amount of jurisprudence regarding FPIC has accumulated in recent
years, particularly by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR).6 Many international organizations have also issued guidelines
and other non-binding norms affirming indigenous peoples' right to FPIC,
including the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the U.N.
Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the U.N.
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the World Commission on Dams,
and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 7
Yet it is important to recognize the limited scope of this "increasing
recognition" and distinguish the legally binding from the non-binding
instruments. Much of this ambiguity arises from the complex nature of
indigenous peoples' rights in lands and resources and the fact that
ownership of subsurface minerals belongs to the state in most of the
developing world.8 Although indigenous peoples' participatory rights
have been recognized in various emerging human rights standards, the
extent to which these rights are rigorously captured by binding treaty
obligations or rules of customary international law remains controversial at
best.9 To date, the ILO Convention No. 169 remains the only binding
instrument explicitly recognizing indigenous peoples' FPIC rights, and it
has so far been ratified by only nineteen countries.10 Moreover, even the
ILO Convention "falls short of upholding rights to mineral or subsurface
resources in cases in which the state generally retains ownership of those
resources.""
Recently, the United Nations adopted the landmark Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 which is the first widely adopted
international text on indigenous peoples' rights. In contrast to ILO
5. See also Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, adopted June 27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5,
1991), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm.
6. See MacKay, supra note 4, at 51-53.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Anne Perrault et al., Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The Public Interest and
Local Community Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC), 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 494
(2007).
9. See John W. Head, Protecting and Supporting Indigenous Peoples in Latin America:
Evaluating the Recent World Bank and IDB Policy Initiatives, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 383, 407-09
(2006); James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples' Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions About
Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have
in Lands and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 7 (2005)
10. Int'l Labour Org., Convention N.C. 169, http://www.ilo.org/iolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C169.
11. Anaya, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295, (Sept. 13, 2007).
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Convention No. 169, which was signed by only nineteen countries, this
U.N. Declaration was approved by 143 Member States. In contrast to the
ILO Convention, however, the U.N. Declaration is a non-binding
instrument, imposing no legal obligations on the signatories. Moreover,
the U.N. Declaration has failed to attain the support of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United States-the only four Member States that
voted against the Declaration.13  Canada's Ambassador remarked,
specifically, that the provisions on the need for States to obtain free, prior
and informed consent before it can act on matters affecting indigenous
peoples were unduly restrictive, and that the provisions on lands,
territories and resources "are overly broad, unclear and capable of a wide
variety of interpretations." 14 Thus, despite the growing trend toward
international recognition of community consent rights, the human rights
framework is still far from offering clear consensus on the legal
enforceability of these rights. In summary, community rights to FPIC are
limited in four important ways: 1) these rights are sui generis to indigenous
communities and are not readily extended to non-indigenous communities;
2) even as applied to indigenous communities, they fall short of applying
to disputes over subsurface resources; 3) these rights are thus far legally
binding on only nineteen countries; and 4) to the extent that these rights
are recognized, they are generally enforceable only against states and not
against private actors. 15 An appropriate question to ask, then, is why states
have not yet agreed to binding treaty obligations, for it is against this legal
backdrop that Laplante and Spears' motivation for building a "business
case" for voluntary corporate FPIC processes becomes clearer.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF A VOLUNTARY FPIC MODEL
Even in the absence of binding international legal obligations on
13. United Nations Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. News Centre,
Sept. 13, 2007,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23794&Cr=indigenous&Crl= (last
visited Apr. 21, 2008).
14. Id.
15. In 1998, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
(Sub-Commission), a subsidiary of the then-Commission on Human Rights, established a
working group of independent experts to make recommendations and proposals relating to
the nexus between transnational corporations and human rights. The Sub-Commission
approved the working group's draft "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" (draft Norms) in
2003, which enumerated a series of corporate responsibilities with respect to human rights for
which businesses could be held directly accountable under international law. Among other
enumerated rights, the draft Norms acknowledged the principle of free, prior and informed
consent of both indigenous peoples and communities. The Human Rights Commission,
however, declined to adopt the draft as non-voluntary international norms. John G. Ruggie,
Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 821 (2007);
see also id. at 832 (explaining that international human rights instruments are traditionally
viewed as imposing only "indirect" responsibilities on corporations).
[Vol. 11
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corporations, Laplante and Spears focus on building a business case for
voluntary FPIC measures. Their argument is built, at least in part, upon
the arguments generated by the World Bank Group's Extractive Industries
Review, released in 2003. In crafting their business case, they point to the
vulnerability of extractive industries to popular protest in the form of
blockades, work stoppages, and other forms of violent resistance, all of
which can prove highly costly to extractive enterprises. The authors argue
that the extractive industries are uniquely vulnerable to community
opposition, due to the inherently high financing, construction, operational,
reputation, and corporate risks that they already face when pursuing
development projects in host countries. 16 Their conclusion is that it is in
the El firm's own interest to undertake voluntary FPIC processes,
suggesting that doing so takes communities and companies out of their
"defensive positions" and puts them in "proactive" stances.17 The World
Resources Institute (WRI) applies the same reasoning, concluding that
voluntary FPIC is simply a matter of business "common sense."' 8
Despite the ostensible "common sense" business case that Laplante
and Spears present, many extractive industry participants continue to resist
the principle of FPIC. This may result from the reality in which FPIC
makes "business sense" in some scenarios and not in others. While it may
make business sense to forego investment in a particular extractive project
in a particular region, the authors fail to counter the very obvious
possibility that it may not make business sense for the industry as a whole
to defer to community consent processes as a matter of universal principle.
Along similar lines, the authors do not adequately address the possibility
that FPIC processes could undermine overarching development goals. The
International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) issued a response to the
Extractive Industries Review, voicing concerns that "[tihe net effect of the
Review would be a reduction in private sector foreign direct investment
going to emerging economies for which extractive industries' projects are
the only available path to development." 19 The ICMM considered the EIR
recommendations to be "costly, counterproductive and unrealistic,"
arguing that "their aggregate impact would add excessive complexity to
the process of preparing and implementing projects.... The end result
would be a 'chilling effect', especially in poor countries." 20 In particular,
the ICMM cautioned that the adoption of voluntary FPIC standards could
16. Laplante & Spears, supra note 1, at 73.
17. Id. at 72.
18. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE
FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT, at v (2007).
19. Letter from David Kerr, Chairman of ICMM, to James Wolfensohn, President, World
Bank Group (Dec. 23,2003), in INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, COMMENTS ON "STRIKING
A BETTER BALANCE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW" (2003)
[hereinafter ICMM COMMENTS] available at
http://www.icmm.com/uploads/201BETTERBALANCEEIRICMM_COMMENTS_webv
ersion.pdf.
20. Executive Summary, in ICMM COMMENTS, supra note 20.
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result in a "reduction in development opportunities and a switch away
from responsible mining companies towards those unconcerned with
adopting international social and environmental standards." 21
This concern reflects a fundamental weakness in building a voluntary
rather than a mandatory legal standard for community consent rights:
without uniform guarantees of enforcement, voluntary adoption of FPIC
standards may put socially responsible corporations at a comparative
disadvantage relative to competing firms that do not pursue community
consent. Under the current state of international law, many state
government interests are aligned with those of the extractive company and
not with those of the local community.22  Consequently, the host
government may find itself confronted by a choice between, on the one
hand, a firm that demands costly and complex community consent
processes which, if consent is withheld, could result in no investment, and
on the other hand, a firm that bypasses community consent processes and
guarantees foreign investment. Thus, the interests of the state and the
corporation that avoids FPIC procedures are perversely aligned.23 The end
result may be that voluntary FPIC processes on the part of extractive
corporations, absent a robust international legal framework holding state
governments accountable for first obtaining community consent, do not, in
fact, make business sense.
In demanding that FPIC be a process by which host communities retain
the power to withhold their consent and thereby unilaterally block a
development project, Laplante and Spears describe a type of CSR initiative
that may prove cost-prohibitive. By insisting not only upon an absolute
veto power for communities at the initial project approval stage, but also a
continuing veto power at any point of the project's development and
implementation, FPIC proponents inadvertently make a business case not
to engage in consultation processes at all. Currently, where FPIC of non-
indigenous communities is not an international legal norm, EI companies
are faced with a choice between bypassing community consultation
procedures, resulting potentially in the financially devastating
consequences described above, or adopting a voluntary model of
community consent. Under a consent model, as proposed by Laplante and
Spears, the business incentives are decidedly skewed towards bypassing
the community altogether. If an El company enters into a contract with the
community, committing to uphold the principles of FPIC, then the
company agrees to grant the community unilateral veto power over the
project at any given stage of its implementation, and the company is bound
by legal contract. In contrast, if the company disregards the community's
21. Id.
22. Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations of
Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability Under International
Law, 11 LEWms & CLARK L. REV. 135, 154-55 (2007).
23. See Ruggie, supra note 15, at 822.
[Vol. 11
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resistance, it is not liable under any international legal obligations; more
importantly, it is not entirely clear that the community could recover
restitution from the host government either. In the absence of an
international law holding either a company or a state accountable for
failure to obtain the consent of a local community, it may remain in a
business' best financial interests to avoid engaging with the community
and entering into an FPIC arrangement.
In addition to difficulties with their business case, the authors also face
challenges in making a development case for voluntary FPIC. A major
vulnerability in the voluntary model is that it forces communities to rely on
their non-legal leverage in negotiating with extractive firms rather than
granting them genuine enforceable rights. Without robust guarantees
under international law, communities remain dependent on their ability to
stage (often violent) protest, and this defensive negotiating posture erodes
communities' entitlements as rights-holders, rather than mere
stakeholders. A further detrimental development effect of voluntary rather
than mandatory FPIC is that it detracts attention from state responsibilities
to promote public participation in state decision-making. Currently,
corporate and state interests are often allied against community interests,
and standard licensing practices allow extractive firms to bypass
community dissent by negotiating directly with the government. In an
effort to fold communities into the licensing dialogue, Laplante and Spears
present an FPIC procedure that asks companies to bypass state
governments by negotiating directly with local communities. Putting aside
sovereignty concerns, this model still raises serious developmental issues,
as it erodes the state's obligations under international law to engage
indigenous populations in state policy- and decision-making. This erosion
of state responsibility to engage the public in meaningful participation can
have detrimental long-term development effects.
While it may seem convenient to ask extractive firms to step in where
government actors fail to meet their international legal obligations, it is
important to remember that "any 'grand strategy' needs to strengthen and
build out from the existing capacity of states and the states system to
regulate and adjudicate harmful actions by corporations, not undermine
it."24 Before turning to voluntary corporate FPIC measures, it may be
imperative to focus first on strengthening the international human rights
framework for holding states accountable for obtaining community consent
before negotiating concessionary agreements with extractive firms.
IV. CONCLUSION: REVISING THE LEGAL CALCULUS TO BUILD A BUSINESS CASE
FOR FPIC
Laplante and Spears argue that existing voluntary CSR initiatives are
24. Id. at 838.
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inadequate mechanisms for extractive industry companies to mitigate or
reduce the risks of community opposition. The authors respond to this
deficiency by proposing more substantive voluntary initiatives on the part
of individual EI firms; however, this Response suggests that the deficiency
of extant voluntary initiatives resides not in their substantive content but
rather in their voluntary nature. Thus, the deficiency cannot be resolved
with new substantive voluntary commitments, but rather only through
more robust procedural safeguards rooted in enforceable international law.
Only by changing the legal parameters within which extractive industry
firms and their financial backers are forced to calculate project costs can
meaningful community participation become a genuinely viable principle
from both a business and a development perspective.
First, the procedural rights that indigenous peoples currently have to
meaningful participation in decisions affecting their land and resources
should be extended to all local communities under new international legal
norms.25 Although it is useful to make the business case for community
rights in the extractive industry, doing so in the absence of an international
legal backbone leaves these communities vulnerable to the variability of
the extractive sector's business calculus. To secure participatory rights for
all communities, the theory must ultimately be grounded in rights-based
norms and not simply discretionary business models.
Second, to make a genuine business case for community consent, the
principle of absolute veto inherent in "consent" may need to be abandoned
in favor of robust procedural guarantees of negotiation leverage. In order
to make community participation a lucrative proposition from a financial
perspective, communities may have to recognize that they lose corporate
buy-in if they insist on a right to veto. Alternatively, if communities are
endowed with a procedural right to prior, meaningful consultation, then
the business incentives for upholding those rights will be adjusted in favor
of meaningful consultation. The reluctance of both the extractive industry
and host governments to adopt the principle of free, prior informed
consent stems from wariness over the grant of unilateral veto power to
communities. The cost of losing a development contract altogether often
outweighs the costs of managing various forms of community social
protest.
Rather than framing FPIC as a community's right to withhold consent,
international law should adopt a model of stakeholder engagement that
holds both states and corporations accountable for ensuring community
participation in decisions affecting their land and resources. As prescribed
in the Final Report of the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review, the
concept of free, prior and informed consent should not be viewed as a:
one-off, yes-no vote or as a veto power for a single person or group.
Rather, it is a process by which indigenous peoples, local communities,
25. Existing articulations of indigenous peoples' FPIC rights are sui generis. Anaya, supra
note 9, at 9-10.
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government, and companies may come to mutual agreements in a
forum that gives affected communities enough leverage to negotiate
conditions under which they may proceed and an outcome leaving the
community clearly better off.26
By offering instead a guarantee that the communities themselves will
engage in "good faith negotiations" with the extractive industry
corporations, rather than exercise absolute refusal to consent, communities
create more obvious incentives for businesses to engage in meaningful
consultations with the community.
Finally, the addition of corporate accountability under international
law should not undermine state responsibilities. While states should be
held primarily responsible for ensuring meaningful community
participation in decisions affecting their land and resources, extractive
industry firms should be held responsible for acquiring state licensing only
after the state has successfully consulted with the local community and
obtained its broad support. While it is necessary to reconfigure the current
imbalance of negotiating power, whereby the corporate interests are
aligned with the state's, it is insufficient to rearrange the negotiating
structure by creating a bilateral partnership between the communities and
the corporations, to the exclusion of the state. In order to facilitate genuine
long-term country stability and sustainable enforcement of public rights to
participate in decisions affecting their lands and resources, consultation
processes in the extractive sector must ultimately create a bridge between
communities and the state.
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